gaelic: you are wrong - I suggest you try to break in your locked down Jolla as you are thinking and you'll find that you can't do it. Yes, maybe there is a bug somewhere and you can exploit it somehow, but that is another matter.

Exactly, you need both.

I don't think the burden of proof and expectation should be residing upon Javis to produce anything.
It is up to the claims of the product...the makers of the device and / or software who claim something does what it says it does.
It is up to them to prove their product is genuine.
To produce proof of that.
It's Double-speak and Product Sales Pitch-speak that is lame...
It just doesn't cut it.
It is up to all of us as consumers to scrutinize their products.
And to cry foul if they aren't proving their claims.
It isn't on Javis's back that all the "proving" needs to be done.
It's the bloody reverse.
It's on the manufacturers back the proving needs doing.

Yes it does ...
In fact I love this cartoon...
explains things best nowadays..
but ...
from "the Christian Science Monitor" ?!?!?!

Say that again:

https://jolla.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/202514138

Go ahead, try it.

You require device pin to enter recovery mode.

Say-Say that again.

quote from your article "There is no guarantee that saving data with these instructions will succeed."

That doesn't seem comforting, safe or encouraging.

It doesn't appear in any way to be considered a "standardized" method approved by the manufacturers...
or else there wouldn't be this kind of disclaimer.

Obviously there is a significant percentage chance of failure or there would be no disclaimer in the 1st place.

Because key and cryptotext are literally a few nanometers apart, both in RAM and in the eMMC. Unless you physically take the key away with you, USB dongle style (and I ponder how frequently would the key be actually removed from a device whose primary usecase is staying most of the time online), then it is fake security. It is completely redundant.

Screenlock does exactly what its name says, and it actually has a purpose.

Because it is fake/redudant (again: exactly what does full device encryption prevent?), and it is annoying because it complicates my use of the device: access from other environments, recovery of data, performance, custom partitioning...

I'm not arguing about removal of actual security. But "security" as a keyword has too much nonsense attached to it, and most of the time it doesn't even refer to real security in any way. "Privacy", on the other hand, is often forgotten... and is actually a much more significant issue since few companies care.

Feel free to continue any of the existing "oh my god security craze!!!" threads where I've already explained myself to exhaustion.

You are actually completely missing the point of the cartoon.
Though I have the advantage of remembering what was going when that cartoon was first published. (Hint: 9/11).

As I said, I've bumped on the fact _that does not work_ when using a lockcode a few times myself.

Perhaps the assumption is that the reason you're doing this in the first place is because your phone wont boot successfully.

As such you might have a borked file system, and the files you recover might be garbage.

True enough...
hell that is essentially the very 1st sentence.
ie- use this method if ...

the next statement being use the backup utility if everything is fine...

still...for emergency data salvage ...(I get that it seems to be a standard disclaimer... but it still makes me nervous ...)